

Message Text

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EXDIS MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING REPEAT SECTO 24041 FROM USDEL SECRETARY ACTION
SECSTATE INFO ANKARA ATHENS BONN COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE
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QUOTE

S E C R E T SECTO 24041

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), PFOR , NATO, NAC
SUBJ: NATOMIN: SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION AT RESTRICTED NAC

SECRETARY KISSINGER OPENED THE RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE
MINISTERIAL, DECEMBER 11, BY SAYING HE WISHED TO CONCENTRATE
AT THIS POINT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DETENTE, RESERVING
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DISCUSSION OF CHINA AND SALT TO DECEMBER 12. IN CHARACTER-
IZING THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE
CURRENTLY BEING CONSIDERED, THE SECRETARY SAID WE ARE NOW

FACING IN THE UNITED STATES A PARADOX IN THAT MANY IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS ARE BOTH INCREASINGLY ANTI-DETENTE AND INCREASINGLY ANTI-DEFENSE BUDGET.

2. THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT DETENTE IS AND WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH THROUGH THE PROCESS LABELED DETENTE. SAYING HE HOPED THE FRENCH WOULD NOT TAKE HIS COMMENT AMISS, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE REGRETTED THAT WE HAVE FOUND A FRENCH WORD FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR BECAUSE THERE IS TOO MUCH OF A TENDENCY TO THINK THAT DETENTE IS A SYNONYM FOR ALLIANCE, FOR FRIENDSHIP, FOR A GENERAL STATE OF GOOD FEELING. INSTEAD, WHAT WE MEAN BY DETENTE IS A SITUATION IN WHICH:

-- WE CONTINUE TO HAVE A SOVIET UNION IDEOLOGICALLY HOSTILE TO THE WEST AND THE UNITED STATES.
--EVEN THOUGH THE IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION IS TODAY LESS THAN IT WAS UNDER STALIN, THE SOVIET UNION IS NEVERTHELESS STRONGER MILITARILY. UNDER STALIN, THE SOVIET UNION WAS IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED, BUT DID NOT HAVE THE MILITARY WHEREWITHAL; TODAY, THE SOVIET UNION'S IDEOLOGY IS MORE TEPID, BUT ITS TECHNICAL AND INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES HAVE INCREASED TO THE POINT WHERE THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES HAVE PRESENTED ADDITIONAL OPTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR SOVIET LEADERS.
--THE POSSIBILITIES OF DETENTE DEPEND ON THE STRENGTH AND VIGILANCE OF THE WEST. WE CANNOT MISLEAD OURSELVES BY PRETENDING THAT RHETORIC IS A SUBSTITUTE FOR MILITARY STRENGTH. WE MUST TRY TO NEGOTIATE OUR DIFFERENCES BUT WE SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DETENTE DEPENDS UPON PERIODS OF GOOD FEELING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

3. PUTTING HIS ANALYSIS IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT AFTER THE LAST WAR, THE WEST WAS IN AN UNUSUAL SITUATION, ONE IN WHICH NATIONS SELDOM FIND THEMSELVES.

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WE WERE MILITARILY PREDOMINANT AND OUR ALLIES COULD RELY ON US TO OVERWHELM ANY THREAT THAT MAY ARISE. TODAY, WE FACE A DIFFERENT PERIOD IN A DIFFERENT SITUATION, AND THIS NEW SITUATION WILL BE PERMANENT. THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW ROUGHLY MILITARILY EQUIVALENT TO THE UNITED STATES. IT IS IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING A SUPER-POWER CAPABLE OF PROJECTING ITS INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE GLOBE AND PRESENTING NEW POSSIBILITIES AND NEW OPTIONS TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THIS NEW CIRCUMSTANCE WILL IMPOSE A DIFFERENT POLICY ON THE WEST.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACTS OF POLITICS IN ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT, EXCEPT THROUGH GROSSEST NEGLIGENCE, PERMIT AN OPPONENT TO OBTAIN STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO LEARN FROM MILITARY HISTORY AND TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT GOING TO PLACE SUCH FAITH IN MILITARY CLAIMS OR IN UNTESTED ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING MISSILE ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY SO AS TO BE TEMPTED TO TRUST ITS FATE TO A STRATEGIC FIRST STRIKE. TO ACT IN SUCH A WAY IS TO ACCEPT AN INVITATION TO PARALYSIS. THE MILITARY PROBLEM, THEN, REQUIRES US TO BE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, THE REGIONAL BALANCE WILL BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. THIS KIND OF BALANCE WILL REQUIRE A MORE COMPLEX POLICY RESPONSE THAN EXISTED IN THE PAST. IN FACT, IT IS THE KIND OF SITUATION WHICH EUROPEAN LEADERS SHOULD NOT FIND STRANGE: THAT OF CONTAINING A LARGE CONTINENTAL POWER THROUGH A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES AND THROUGH CONFRONTING SMALLER CRISES AROUND THE PERIPHERY.

5. THUS, DETENTE INVOLVES CONTAINING SOVIET POWER UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH WE GEAR OUR POLICIES TO A PERMANENT SITUATION. WE CANNOT AFFORD PERIODS, SUCH AS WE HAD IN THE 50'S AND 60'S, OF EXTREME VIGILANCE FOLLOWED BY EXAGGERATED EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION IN WHICH WE PRETEND THAT ALL PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED. WE NEED DETENTE SO THAT OUR PUBLICS CAN SEE THAT WE ARE DOING WHAT WE
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CAN TO PRESERVE THE PEACE AND AT THE SAME TIME WILL SUPPORT THE EFFORT TO INSURE THAT OUR MILITARY POSTURE IS STRONG ENOUGH SO THAT WE ARE NOT CONFRONTED BY THE RISKS OF HAVING TO GIVE IN TO PRESSURE BY THE SOVIETS.

6. THUS, THE SECRETARY UNDERSCORED, IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE WILL HAVE TO RESIST PRESSURES ON A GLOBAL BASIS AS WELL AS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF CONTAINING SOVIET EXPANSION, GAINING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING, MAINTAINING WESTERN STRENGTH AND FROM THIS POSTURE OVER TIME TO BRING ABOUT LONGER TERM CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION.

7. ANALYZING THE SOVIET POSITION, THE SECRETARY DEFINED THE FACTORS FOR TENSION:

--THERE HAS BEEN A GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER. THE SOVIET GROWTH IS A PRODUCT OF IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH. IT IS FUTILE FOR THE WEST TO

COMPLAIN ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT AND ESCAPISM TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVITE GROWTH WILL NOT HAVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES AND PROVIDE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WITH DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES AND POSSIBILITIES. THIS SITUATION IMPLIES A THREAT FOR YEARS TO COME UNTIL PERHAPS PRESSURES FROM THE EAST MAY LEAD THE SOVIETS TO SEEK A MORE PERMANENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE DEALT WITH NOT BY RHETORIC BUT BY THE VIGILANCE THAT OFFERS THE SOVIET UNION NO ADVANTAGE. AS HIS PERSONAL NIGHTMARE, THE SECRETARY CITED A HYPOTHETICAL RUSSIAN KENNEDY COMING ALONG AND URGING HIS FELLOW RUSSIANS TO "GET THIS COUNTRY MOVING."

--IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT ONE OF THE FACTORS LEADING TO INSTABILITY IS THE VERY WORRISOME DEMORALIZATION OF THW EST.

8. THE SECRETARY NEXT CITED THE FACTORS FOR STABILITY:

--SO MUCH OF THE ENERGIES OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS CONSUMED IN INTERNAL DISPUTES AND ARGUMENTS REGARDING DOMESTIC MANAGEMENT THAT RELATIVELY LITTLE IS AVAILABLE

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TO BE DEVOTED TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY MATTERS.

--ALSO, THE POSSIBLE GAINS TO THE SOVIETS DO NOT MERIT A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST. THE DANGER LIES, INSTEAD, IN A SLIDE INTO A CONFRONTATION THROUGH THE RAISING OF STAKES ON A VARIETY OF SMALLER ISSUES.

9. IN THAT CONTEXT, THE SECRETARY CITED OUR POLICIES AS BEING:

--TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET MODERATE ELEMENTS;
--TO AVOID CONFRONTATIONS WHERE POSSIBLE;
--TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE A LONGER TERM STABILITY IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

10. TO ILLUSTRATE THE LATTER POINT, THE SECRETARY COMMENTED ON SALT. HE SAID THAT WHAT WE WANTED TO ACHIEVE IS STABILIZATION OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. CURRENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS 2600 STRATEGIC UNITS, THE UNITED STATES 2100. UNDER THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, THERE WOULD BE A BALANCE ESTABLISHED AT 2400 STRATEGIC UNITS APIECE. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT NO STRATEGIC BREAKTHROUGH IS POSSIBLE WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE US ANY DECISIVE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OVER THE SOVIET UNION. WITHOUT A NEW SALT AGREEMENT,

--EITHER CONGRESS WILL NOT VOTE MORE MONEY FOR ARMS, THUS A STRATEGIC GAP WILL OPEN WHICH, IN TURN, COULD LEAD TO DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS ON THE PART OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THERE WILL THUS BE POLITICAL BUT NOT STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES.

--OR, CONGRESS WILL VOTE MORE MONEY FOR NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND AS A CONSEQUENCE FUNDS WILL NOT BE SPENT WHERE THEY SHOULD BE SPENT, ON CONVENTIONAL AND TACTICAL FORCES.

11. IF THERE IS NO SALT AGREEMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE TO ASK CONGRESS TO PROVIDE WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A STRATEGIC

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EQUILIBRIUM. STRATEGIC ARMS ASIDE, IT IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE WEST TO PUT MORE STRESS ON TACTICAL AND REGIONAL FORCES. HE SAID HE STRONGLY SUPPORTED SECRETARIES SCHLESINGER'S AND RUMSFELD'S EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FOR NATO AND TO IMPROVE THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION CAPABILITY. HE SAID HE ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE IN THE LONGER TERM SUCH NEGOTIATIONS CREATE INTERESTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAVE A STAKE IN STABILITY IN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND LEADERS IDENTIFIED WITH THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WHO IN TIMES OF CRISES WILL ARGUE FOR MODERATION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST NOT FOOL OURSELVES INTO THINKING THAT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIET UNION WILL ABANDON ANY IMPORTANT INTERESTS SIMPLY FOR THE SAKE OF AGREEMENT. THERE IS A FINE LINE THAT MUST BE DRAWN BUT IT IS NOT A LINE WHICH CAN BE DETERMINED MATHEMATICALLY.

12. SPEAKING MORE BROADLY, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WITH RESPECT TO CHALLENGES FROM THE SOVIET UNION, IT IS GOOD TO RECALL THAT WE BRING MANY OF OUR PROBLEMS ON OURSELVES. SAYING THAT HE HOPED THE PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT MIND IF HE RAISED THE MATTER, HE SAID, NEVERTHELESS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT CAUSED THE PORTUGUESE CRISIS. THE GROWTH OF ITALIAN COMMUNISM IS NOT SOMETHING WHICH HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE SOVIET UNION, BUT RATHER BY WEAKNESSES IN THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM.

13. IN ANGOLA, WE SEE A CASE OF MORAL COLLAPSE BY THE WEST. ONE OF THE ELEMENTS WHICH LED TO THE CRISIS WAS THE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH PREVENTED ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. THE US FINALLY DECIDED TO ACT AND THAT,

NOW, IS INFLUENCING THE SITUATION. BUT ANGOLA ALSO REVEALS ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SOVIETS - THAT OF A SUPER-POWER WHICH HAS CHOSEN TO INTERVENE MANY THOUSANDS OF MILES AWAY FROM ITS HEARTLAND AND WHERE IT HAS NO TRADITIONAL INTERESTS. THIS ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE IN EVENTS SUCH AS ANGOLA IS

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BOUND TO BE WORRISOME TO CHINA. THE SECRETARY ASSURED THE OTHER NATO MINISTERS THAT THE US WILL RESIST THE SOVIETS IN ANGOLA REGARDLESS OF DETENTE.

14. IN SUMMING UP, THE SECRETARY DEFINED THE PROBLEM BY SAYING THAT IF WE ARE WISE, WHATEVER DIFFERENCES WE HAVE WITH THE EAST SHOULD NOT LEAD US TO SEEK CONFRONTATION OR TO ENCOURAGE TRUCULENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD NOT MISLEAD OURSELVES INTO RELYING ON THE GOODWILL OF SOVIET LEADERS. WE MUST ALSO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR LONGER TERM POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. IF WE ARE TRUCULENT, WE RISK A REPETITION OF SHIFTS BETWEEN CONFRONTATION AND EXAGGERATED CONVIVIALITY, WHICH COULD BRING ABOUT A DIVIDED PUBLIC OPINION, SUCH AS OCCURRED ON VIET-NAM.

15. THE LONGER TERM PROBLEM OF CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNION, THE SECRETARY REPEATED, IS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH CONFRONTED FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE 19TH CENTURY. AT THAT TIME, THOSE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAD TO DEAL WITH A POTENTIALLY DOMINANT CONTINENTAL POWER. THIS CANNOT BE DONE THROUGH A SERIES OF CRISES. RATHER, IT REQUIRES THAT POLICIES BE SUSTAINED FOR A MATTER OF DECADES. THIS, IN TURN, REQUIRES A HIGHER DEGREE OF POLITICAL COORDINATION AND A SUBTLER APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE THAN IN THE PAST. IT IS NOT SIMPLY A QUESTION, AS SOME MAINTAIN, OF ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE SOME MEASURE OF GOODWILL FROM SOVIET LEADERS. WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUSPECT THAT LEADERS WHO ROSE THROUGH BLOODY PURGES WOULD TREAT US ANY BETTER THAN THEY TREAT EACH OTHER. NOR ARE WE TRYING TO CHANGE THEIR CHARACTER. WE ARE, INSTEAD, SEEKING TO DEVELOP THROUGH DETENTE A STABLE POLICY FOR THE LONGER TERM.

16. PRIOR TO THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION, SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS OPENED THE RESTRICTED SESSION, BY NOTING THAT THE MINISTERS HAD DECIDED TO DEAL WITH EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INCLUDING CHINA, IN THE RESTRICTED SESSION. HE OBSERVED THAT THE US AMBASSADOR TO NATO HAD GIVEN THE ALLIES SOME IDEA OF WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER MIGHT

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RAISE IN HIS PRESENTATION. LUNS REMINDED THE MINISTERS THAT IN THE RESTRICTED SESSION EACH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS PRIVILEGED TO RAISE WHATEVER SUBJECTS HE WISHES.

17. LUNS WENT ON TO CITE TWO PROBLEMS WHICH HE CONSIDERED URGENT:

--THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE DETENTE ATMOSPHERE HAS ERODED THE WILL OF PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS TO MAINTAIN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. HIS APPREHENSION WAS STRENGTHENED BECAUSE OF THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT PEACEFUL INTENTIONS AND SUCH ACTS AS THEIR ARMS BUILDUP AND THEIR ACTIVITIES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.

--THE CONTINUED AGGRAVATION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. LUNS WONDERED WHETHER THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED COULD NOT MORE USEFULLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE HEALTH OF THE ALLIANCE, WHICH THEIR DISPUTES WEAKEN BUT ON WHICH THEIR SECURITY DEPENDS.

18. LUNS SAID HE HAD TO DISCHARGE AN ADDITIONAL TASK. THE DEFENSE MINISTERS IN THE DPC ASKED THAT HE EXPRESS TO FOREIGN MINISTERS THEIR CONCERN OVER THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE, POST-HELSINKI. IF THE WEST IS NOT CAREFUL, THE USSR MAY BE ENABLED TO ATTAIN ITS OBJECTIVES BECAUSE THE WEST OVERESTIMATES THE STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE OF LEFT-WING IDEOLOGY IN WESTERN EUROPEE.

19. FINALLY, LUNS REMINDED THE MINISTERS THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO WITH OPTION III AND WHEN TO PRESENT IT TO THE OTHER SIDE, WHETHER NOW OR LATER IN JANUARY. KISSINER UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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